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HAS THE BOWSHER DOCTRINE SOLVED THE
DEBATE?: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
STANDING AND INTERVENTION
AS OF RIGHT
Elizabeth Zwickert Timmermans*
INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,1 Congress delegated
its rulemaking power to the Supreme Court in order to unify the procedural rules governing the federal judiciary. 2 With this delegated
authority, the Supreme Court developed the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which "govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts" and are "construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."3 Thus, when regulating judicial proceedings,
courts apply the Rules with an eye toward achieving these objectives.
However, the goals of facilitating fair, expedient, and inexpensive
judicial actions must be interpreted in light of constitutional conditions such as the "case" and "controversy" requirements of Article
1114-for "it is axiomatic that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do
'5
not create or withdraw federal jurisdiction.
Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2009; B.A., Psychology,
University of Notre Dame, 2004. I would like to thank Professors Lloyd Mayer and
Jay Tidmarsh for their assistance with this Note, as well as the entire editorial board
and staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for their diligence and hard work. I would like
to extend a heartfelt thank you to my family, particularly my husband, who
encouraged me to see this Note through to the end.
1 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (2006).
2 See 1JAMEs WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.04[1] [a], at 1-9
(Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007).
3 FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
4 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
*

5

Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978); see also FED.

R. CIv. P. 82 ("These rules do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts
or the venue of actions in those courts.").
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Intervention as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a) has created tension between the Federal Rules and Article III standing requirements
as the circuit courts have struggled to clearly delineate the respective
interests required to participate in a lawsuit. The circuits continue to
disagree whether the interest required to confer Article III standing is
greater, less than, or equivalent to the interest required to intervene
in a dispute. Some courts recognize that, pragmatically, the interests
required for standing and intervention are usually "equivalent. '6 In
certain cases, however, the interests do not overlap. In this situation, a
majority of courts argue that the interest required for intervention is
not as weighty as the interest required for standing because once an
Article III case or controversy has been established between the original parties, jurisdiction cannot be destroyed by an intervening party
who does not possess a standing interest in the dispute. In contrast, a
minority of courts asserts that because the intervenor wants to become
a "suitor" and act on "equal footing" with the original parties, Article
III requirements are not met unless the intervenor has an interest that
would be sufficient to bring an independent claim in federal court.
Although the Supreme Court recognized in 1986 that the circuit
courts were struggling with this issue, it has declined to resolve the
dispute. 7 During that same Term, the Court developed what has
become known as the Bowshe 8 doctrine, which stands for the proposition that a court will not analyze whether each individual party has
standing to bring a claim, but will only ensure that one of the moving
parties can meet the standing requirements. 9 In 2003, the Court
extended the Bowsher doctrine to encompass potential Rule 24(a)
intervenors, yet set an interesting limit on the doctrine in relation to
intervention. 10

This Note examines the implications of the extension of the Bowsher doctrine to intervention as of right. Additionally, this Note challenges the bright-line positions of the circuit courts and suggests a
method of dealing with intervention and standing that examines the
relative posture of the potential intervenor-bringing a claim or protecting an interest that is new or is already presented by a same-side
6 The use of the term "equivalent" throughout this Note does not take the meaning "exactly the same," but rather reflects the pragmatic recognition by some courts
that the interests of standing and intervention overlap so substantially that satisfying
one interest will almost always satisfy the other, making the intervention/standing
dilemma a nonissue except in very rare cases.
7 See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986).
8 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
9 See id. at 721.
10 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003).
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party with Article III standing-and embraces the goals of both intervention and standing. The Note concludes that with the extension of
the Bowsher doctrine, the overlap of interests that satisfy both standing
and intervention as of right requirements, and the distinction
between bringing a claim and protecting an interest, standing is only
relevant for those individuals seeking to bring new claims before the
court and who therefore create mini-trials that have Article III
implications.
Part I of this Note examines Rule 24(a) (2) intervention as of
right. Part II briefly reviews the Article III requirements of standing to
be heard before a federal court. Part III summarizes the few Supreme
Court cases that explore the relationship between standing and intervention. Part IV analyzes the three main positions of the circuit courts
and the responses of various commentators. Finally, Part V reexamines the relationship between standing and intervention in light of the
Court's relatively recent expansion of the Bowsher doctrine and analyzes what types of intervention remain problematic to the notion of
an Article III case or controversy.
I.

INTERVENTION AS OF RIGHT

Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a self-help measure allowing absentees to protect themselves when they have questions of law or fact in common with the existing action and can meet
certain criteria set forth by the Rule.11 Before allowing intervention, a
court must consider various competing goals of the judiciary system to
ensure "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of the
action. 12 These goals include the interests of the original parties in
controlling the litigation, the need for protection of third parties that
14
have a stake in the litigation,1 3 and efficiency concerns of the court.
11 See FED. R. Crv. P. 24. The function of the Rule, however is to protect the third
parties and not to favor them. See, e.g., Note, Intervention and the Meaning of "Bound"
Under Federal Rule 24(a)(2), 63 YALE L.J. 408, 417 (1954) (arguing that applying the
original version of Rule 24 more liberally in favor of third parties would "only prove
illiberal in its effect upon federal procedure and rights of original parties").
12 FED. R. Crv. P. 1.
13 See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of theJudge in PublicLaw Litigation,89 HARv. L.
REV. 1281, 1290 (1976) ("[I]f the right to participate in litigation is no longer determined by one's claim to relief at the hands of another party or one's potential liability
to satisfy the claim, it becomes hard to draw the line determining those who may
participate so as to eliminate anyone who is or might be significantly (a weasel word)
affected by the outcome-and the latest revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has more or less abandoned the attempt."); see also Raoul Berger, Intervention by
Public Agencies in Private Litigation in the Federal Courts, 50 YALE L.J. 65, 65, 69 (1940)
("The basic problem of intervention practice is the adjustment between the need for
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In order to establish a right to intervene under the original version of Rule 24, applicants were required to show both that they would
be "bound" by an adverse judgment and that their interests were not
represented adequately by the existing parties to the action. 1 5 While
some courts interpreted "bound" to mean "practical prejudice," a
majority of courts interpreted the term to require a showing of res
judicata.' 6 "That reading created a Catch-22: movants who were not
adequately represented by the existing parties necessarily could not be
bound under res judicata principles, and those who would be bound
could not demonstrate inadequate representation." 17 This narrow
approach to intervention was upheld by the Supreme Court in Sam
Fox Publishing Co. v. United States,' 8 in which the Court denied intervention to music publishers in an antitrust suit since they would not

[protection of third parties] and the traditional view that a law suit is a private controversy in which outsiders have no place.").
14 See Brian Hutchings, Note, Waiting for Divine Intervention: The Fifth Circuit Tries
to Give Meaning to Intervention Rules in Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 43 VILE. L.
REv. 693, 700-01 (1998). The Court must allow intervention in order to prevent
duplicitous litigation but deny intervention when it would result in a single case that
has become unwieldy. See, e.g.,
Kerry C. White, Note, Rule 24(a) Intervention of Right:
Why the Federal Courts Should Require Standing to Intervene, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 527,
555-57 (2002) (distinguishing between potential future claimants-that is, parties
with interests "so intertwined with the subject matter of the action" that an unfavorable decision will likely provide a basis for standing in the future-and public interest
claimants-that is, parties who tend to bring complex, general grievances and who
"do not, and will not, have standing to litigate their asserted interests regardless of the
outcome of the decision").
15 See Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 415, 428-29 (citing FED.
R. Crv. P. 24(a)(2) (1938) (amended 1966)).
16 See id. at 429. Pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion,
courts give a claimant only "one chance to vindicate all rights to reliefencompassed in a
single claim." RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE 589 (5th
ed. 2008).
17 Alan Jenkins, Foxes Guarding the Chicken Coup: Intervention as of Right and the
Defense of Civil Rights Remedies, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 263, 271-72 (1999) (footnote
omitted); see also White, supra note 14, at 537 ("[U]nder the narrow construction of
old Rule 24(a) (2), a party could only intervene if they could prove their interests were
not adequately represented for the purpose of intervention while proving their interests were adequately represented for the purpose of resjudicata so that they would be
bound by anyjudgment in their absence. This catch-22 functioned 'as a virtual bar on
intervention of right.'" (quoting Erik Figlio, Stacking the Deck Against "PurelyEconomic
Interests" Inequity and Intervention in EnvironmentalLitigation, 35 GA. L. REv. 1219, 1226
(2001))).
18 366 U.S. 683 (1961).

200 9 )

STANDING

AND

INTERVENTION

AS

OF RIGHT

1415

be bound by adjudication of the dispute, despite recognizing the
interests of the publishers in the subject matter of the suit. 19
Shortly after Sam Fox, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
revised the Federal Rules, 20 and "some elasticity was injected" into the
practice of allowing intervention. 2 1 Although the language of the
Rules was again amended in 2007, the elasticity injected into Rule 24
in 1966 remains. Intervention into a suit is allowed either "of right"
under Rule 24(a) 22 or permissively at the judge's discretion after balancing efficiency and prejudice concerns under Rule 24(b). 23 Rule
24(a) (2) governs intervention as of right and requires satisfaction of
four distinct requirements: (1) the application for intervention must
be timely, (2) the absentee must have an interest relating to the subject of the action, (3) disposition of the case without the absentee will
impair or impede protection of the absentee's related interest, and
19 Id. at 691. "We regard it as fully settled that a person whose private interests
coincide with the public interest in government antitrust litigation is nonetheless not
bound by the eventuality of such litigation, and hence may not, as of right, intervene
in it." Id. at 689.

20 This revision was in large part a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Sam
Fox, and the Advisory Committee sought to "promote more flexible, practical judicial
application generally." Tobias, supra note 15, at 429. Carl Tobias argues that the
amendments to Rules 19, 23, and 24 did not contemplate public law litigation. See id.
at 459. But see Chayes, supra note 13, at 1288-90 (suggesting that changes in the
Federal Rules resulted from the transformation of litigation from private and individual to public and group based).
21 Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 134
(1967).
22 See FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a).
23 See id. 24(b). The Rule states:
(1) In General,On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene
who:
(A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or
(B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common
question of law or fact.
(2) By a Government Officer orAgency. On timely motion, the court may permit
a federal or state governmental officer or agency to intervene if a party's
claim or defense is based on:
(A) a statute or executive order administered by the officer or agency;
or
(B) any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made
under the statute or executive order.
(3) Delay or Prejudice. In exercising its discretion, the court must consider
whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the original parties' rights.
Id. The focus of this Note will be on intervention as of right and, more particularly,
the requirements under Rule 24(a) (2).
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(4) the applicant is not adequately represented by the parties already
involved in the suit. 24 If these requirements are met, the court must

allow intervention. 25 The second and third prongs of the intervention
as of right test require an "interest"; however, "there is no authoritative definition of precisely what kinds of interests satisfy the requirements of the rule." 26 Although noting a divisive circuit split regarding

the relationship between intervention as of right and the justiciability
issue of standing, the Supreme Court has declined to explicitly define
what constitutes an interest sufficient to intervene. 27 As a result, the
lower courts have continued to demand varying levels of "interests" by
28
prospective intervenors.
II.

STANDING TO SUE

Article III of the Constitution limits the federal judicial power to
deciding "Cases" and "Controversies." 29 Additionally, while declaring
that " [i] t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,"' 30 thus establishing the right of judicial
review, Marbury v. Madison3 l also stands for the propositions that Article III serves as a ceiling on the jurisdiction of federal courts and that
there are limitations inherent in the concept of case or controversy
itself.3 2 These constitutionally mandated limitations on the federal
judiciary are reflected in the justiciability doctrines, which include
prohibitions against advisory opinions, mootness, ripeness, the politi33
cal question doctrine, and standing.
Although "the concept of 'Art[icle] III standing' has not been
defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases decided
24 See id. 24(a)(2); 6 MOORE, supra note 2, § 24.03[1 ] [a], at 24-23.
25 See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (2) ("On timely motion, the court must permit anyone
to intervene who: ... claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is
the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless
existing parties adequately represent that interest." (emphasis added)). Rule
24(a) (1) also allows intervention as of right where an individual "is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute." Id. 24(a) (1).
26 6 MOORE, supra note 2, § 24.03[21[a], at 24-28.
27 See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986) (declining to detail the
relationship between the respective interests required for standing and intervention
as it was not necessary for disposition of the case).
28 See discussion infra Part IV.
29 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
30 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
31 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137.
32 See id. at 173-80.
33 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49-50 (3d ed. 2006).
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by [the Supreme] Court, ' 34 standing is generally considered to be the
determination of "whether the litigant is entitled to have the court
decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. '35 The three
constitutional requirements of standing are a concrete injury3 6 : (1)
that is distinct, palpable, undifferentiated, and particularized;3 7 (2)
that is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct; and (3) that is likely
to be redressed by a favorable decision. 38 Additionally, federal courts
recognize prudential standing requirements which "are based not on
the Constitution, but instead on prudent judicial administration."3 9
As a result, unlike the constitutional barriers to standing, the prudential limitations can be overcome through legislation that creates judicial rights. 40 These prudential requirements include prohibitions
against third-party claims, generalized grievances, 4 1 and claims falling
42
outside of the zone of interest protected by the statute at issue.

34 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982); see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
EssentialElement of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882-83 (1983)
(noting "[t]he sea-change that has occurred in the judicial attitude towards the doctrine of standing" that is apparent when comparing various Supreme Court opinions).
35 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
36 But see generally David M. Driesen, Standingfor Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808 (2004) (arguing
that injury is not related to standing's goal of concrete adverseness, especially in the
context of public law litigation).
37 In his dissent in EC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), Justice Scalia criticized the
majority for ignoring the requirements that an injury be particularized rather than
undifferentiated in its decision to allow a generalized grievance where the injury itself
(deprivation of information) was considered to be concrete. See id. at 35-36 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
38 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Redressability is not a tight concept under current
law, and "a plaintiff need not show narrow tailoring of the remedy to his injury."
Juliet Johnson Karastelev, Note, On the Outside Seeking in: Must Intervenors Demonstrate
Standing to Join a Lawsuit?, 52 DuKE L.J. 455, 460 (2002) (arguing that this more lenient redressability requirement is helpful for intervenors as they often present more
indirect interests).
39 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 33, at 63.
40 See id.
41 Some commentators argue that in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
Karasthe ban on generalized grievances became a constitutional mandate. See, e.g.,
telev, supra note 38, at 459 (claiming that Lujan transformed the ban on generalized
grievances "from a prudential concern to a constitutional mandate").
42 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982).
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In limiting who can bring certain claims in federal courts, standing promotes several important judicial values. 43 First, standing
restricts the scope of judicial review and interference with other
branches of the government, thus protecting the separation of powers
and maintaining the structure of the federal government. 44 Second,
standing promotes efficiency by limiting the number of suits that can
be brought into federal courts. Third, standing promotes concrete
adverseness, "which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions." 45 Finally, "standing requirements are said to serve the
value of fairness by ensuring that people will raise only their own
rights and concerns and that people cannot be intermeddlers trying
to protect others who do not want the protection offered." 46
III.

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

Like the doctrine of standing, the judicial attitude toward the
interest required for intervention as of right has fluctuated over the
years. Initially, the Supreme Court expounded a liberal definition of
intervention in dicta which it then adopted in a subsequent case.
Then the Court moved toward a narrower view of the types of interests
that would satisfy the standards of intervention under Rule 24(a).
Since that time, however, the Supreme Court has reverted to a more
liberal approach toward the doctrine, allowing intervention where the
intervenor can "piggyback" on the standing of another party-at least
where the intervenor's position is "identical" to that of the party with
standing.
A.

Intervention Prior to Bowsher

The Supreme Court faced its first interpretation of revised Rule
24(a) (2) in Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.4 7 and
43

For a general overview of the four judicial values discussed in this paragraph,
supra note 33, at 61-62.
44 See, e.g.,
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); see also Scalia, supra note 34,
at 894 ("There is, I think, a functional relationship [between the separation of powers
and the doctrine of standing], which can best be described by saying that the law of
standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting
individuals and minorities against impositions of the majority, and excludes them
from the even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches
see CHEMERINSKY,

should function in order to serve the interest of the majority itself").
45 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
46 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 33, at 62.
47 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
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adopted a liberal definition of intervention. 48 In Cascade, the United
States brought suit, challenging the substance of a divestiture decree
by the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, pursuant to a prior
holding by the Supreme Court. 49 Three parties, the State of California, Southern California Edison Company, and Cascade Natural Gas
Corporation, sought to join the antitrust litigation in support of the
United States, but were denied intervention under Rule 24(a) by the
district court.50 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the natural
gas interests of the State of California and Southern California Edison
were sufficient to warrant intervention even under a narrow interpretation of Rule 24(a) since the appellants were "'so situated' geograph51
ically as to be 'adversely affected' within the meaning of [the Rule] .Based on the language in the Advisory Committee's notes to the
revised Federal Rules, the Court rejected a rigid view of intervention
that would bar involvement by Cascade, the third applicant and a sup2
plier of natural gas who claimed an unfair division of gas reserves.5
As a result, in its first interpretation of the revised Rule 24(a), the
Court found that since the merits of the case had to be fully reopened
48 Id. at 133-35. In Cascade, the Court specifically adopted a liberal definition of
intervention set forth in dicta in a 1941 case before its resjudicata interpretation in
Sam Fox and the resulting Rule revisions. See Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United
States, 312 U.S. 502, 506 (1941) (defining intervention as of right as a process
"whereby an appeal is made to the court's good sense to allow persons having a common interest with the formal parties to enforce the common interest with their individual emphasis").
49 386 U.S. at 131-32. Three years earlier, the Court had found that a merger
between Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation and El Paso Natural Gas violated the
Clayton Act and directed the district court "to order divestiture without delay." See
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 662 (1964).
50 Cascade, 386 U.S. at 132.
51 Id. at 135. The prior version of the Rule, which the district court had relied
upon for denial of intervention, allowed intervention as of right upon timely
application:
"(1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to
intervene; or (2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by
existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be
bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
which is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court or
an officer thereof."
Id. at 143-44 (StewartJ, dissenting) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) (1963) (amended
1966)). The Court found that two of the appellants met the requirements of Rule
24(a) (3), which was generally interpreted strictly but had been greatly injected with
elasticity during the 1966 revisions. See id. at 133-35 (majority opinion).
52 Id. at 134-36.
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for the State of California and Southern California Edison, 53 the rule
was "broad enough" to allow intervention by Cascade, especially considering that the "'existing parties' . . . f[ell] far short of representing
54
its interests."
A few years later, the Court narrowed El Paso's broad intervention
language in Donaldson v. United States5 5 by requiring an applicant to
possess a "significantly protectable interest."56 The intervenor, Donaldson, worked for Acme Circus Operating Co., and as part of an
investigation of Donaldson's income tax returns, IRS special agents
issued summonses to Acme and Acme's accountant demanding their
testimony and presentation of documents relating to Donaldson's tax
liability.5 7 Shortly before these summonses were issued, however, the
district court had issued temporary restraining orders preventing the
parties from complying with the IRS agents' requests or summonses
absent a court order. 58 After issuance of the restraining orders, the
United States filed suit with the district court to order compliance
against Acme and Acme's accountant, and Donaldson sought to intervene in the dispute pursuant to Rule 24(a) (2). 59 In upholding the
district court's denial of Donaldson's petition to intervene, the Court
asserted that a taxpayer cannot "intervene as of right simply because it
53 The case was to be reopened since the Court found that the proposed divestiture decree by the district court did "the opposite of what [the Court's] prior opinion
and mandate commanded." Id. at 142.
54 Id. at 136. In the opinion, the Court recognized Cascade's argument that it
had "standing to intervene," but never explicitly addressed those arguments in its
holding. Id. at 133. Some have suggested that the failure to discuss the standing
argument provides evidence that standing is not necessary for intervention. See, e.g.,
Hutchings, supra note 14, at 710 ("Although the Court did not explicitly state why
Cascade satisfied Rule 24's interest requirement, it seemed to imply that an intervenor does not have to demonstrate a concrete right conferred by law as an interest."). But see White, supra note 14, at 541 ("Ironically, the factors implicating
Cascade's interest were argued to provide 'standing to intervene,' although the Court
never addressed whether Cascade had established standing or whether it was
required." (footnotes omitted) (quoting Cascade, 386 U.S. at 133)). Others have suggested that Cascadeshould be limited to its specific facts based on the Court's dissatisfaction with the federal government's handling of an antitrust case with national
consequences. See David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators,81 HARv.L. REV. 721, 757 (1968); Tobias, supra note 15, at 433.
55 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
56 Id. at 531. This term, however, has never become "a term of art inthe law" as
there is disagreement regarding its exact meaning. 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1908.1, at 307-08 (3d ed. 2007).
57 Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 518-19.
58 Id. at 519-20.
59 Id. at 520-21.
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is his tax liability that is the subject of the summons." 60 Instead, the
Court held that an applicant must have a "significantly protectable
interest," such as a proprietary interest in the tax records or claims of
61
privilege or abuse of process against the IRS.
The next year, in Trbovich v. United Mine Workers,62 the Supreme
Court granted intervention to a union member seeking to challenge
the legality of the election of union officers under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959,63 despite statutory language limiting standing for such suits to the Secretary of
Labor. 64 The union member, Trbovich, filed a complaint with the
Secretary regarding the election of officers for the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA).65 After an investigation, the Secretary filed
suit, asking the district court to require that a new election be held
under the Secretary's supervision. 66 Trbovich sought to intervene in
the Secretary's action, but the district court denied his motion "on the
ground that the LMRDA expressly stripped union members of any
right to challenge a union election in the courts, and gave that right
exclusively to the Secretary. ' 67 The Supreme Court reversed and
granted Trbovich's application for intervention, finding that the legislative history of the Act provided "no evidence whatever that Congress
was opposed to participation by union members in the litigation." 68
Instead, the Court made a distinction between intervention in and
initiation of suits, and determined that Trbovich's intervention in the
60

Id. at 530. This holding resolved a circuit split, disagreeing with the interpreta-

tions of the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, while upholding decisions of the First,

Second, and Fifth Circuits. Id. The Court did, however, note that in cases where
"'the material is sought for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a

criminal prosecution'" or the material is protected by attorney-client privilege, the
district court could recognize the taxpayer's right to permissive intervention. Id.
(quoting Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964)).
61 Id. at 523-24, 531. The Court noted that the IRS was merely seeking the routine business records of third parties and not of the individual taxpayer. Id. at
522-23. The IRS is now required to notify the taxpayer of any third-party summons
and give the taxpayer the right "to intervene in any proceeding with respect to the
enforcement of such summons." 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(1) (2006).
62 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
63 Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
29 U.S.C.).
64 Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 531-32.
65 Id. at 529.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 530.
68 Id. at 532-33.
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suit "subject[ed] the union to relatively little additional burden." 69
The Court did, however, note limitations to union member participation: (1) intervention could not interfere with the purpose of the
Act 70 and (2) intervention was limited to only those claims presented
71

by the Secretary's complaint.
In Diamond v. Charles,72 the Supreme Court held that a defendant
intervenor without an independent basis for standing in a dispute was
unable to appeal an unfavorable decision without the original defendant. 73 Without discussing whether the intervention was permissive or
of right or describing how Diamond, a physician and conscientious
objector to abortion, met the requirements of Rule 24, the district
court granted Diamond's motion to intervene as a defendant in a
challenge to the constitutionality of the Illinois Abortion Law of
1975.74 The district court permanently enjoined various provisions of
75
the abortion law, a decision that was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit.
The State of Illinois decided not to appeal, but Diamond filed a notice
of appeal with the Supreme Court, attempting to independently chal69 Id. at 536 ("Intervention by union members in a pending enforcement suit,
unlike initiation of a separate suit, subjects the union to relatively little additional
burden. The principal intrusion on internal union affairs has already been accomplished, in that the union has already been summoned into court to defend the legality of its election." (footnote omitted)).
70 Id. at 532 ("A review of the legislative history shows that Congress made suit by
the Secretary the exclusive post-election remedy for two principal reasons: (1) to protect unions from frivolous litigation and unnecessary judicial interference with their
elections, and (2) to centralize in a single proceeding such litigation as might be
warranted with respect to a single election."). The Court found no interference at
this stage. Id. at 536.
71 Id. at 536-37 ("[A]t least insofar as petitioner seeks only to present evidence
and argument in support of the Secretary's complaint, there is nothing in the language or the history of the LMRDA to prevent such intervention."). Justice Douglas,
on the other hand, felt that limiting the individual's intervention to those claims
addressed by the Secretary ignored the purpose of the revised Rule 24 and the purposes of Title VI. Id. at 540 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). Although the Court
limited Trbovich's claims to those of the Secretary, the Court disagreed with the Secretary that Trbovich's interests were thus adequately represented under the meaning
of Rule 24. Id. at 538-39 (majority opinion). Instead, a complaint about the adequacy of his representation "filed by the member who initiated the entire enforcement proceeding" was a sufficient interest to allow intervention under Rule 24. Id. at
539.
72 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
73 Id. at 68-69.
74 Id. at 57-58. The law imposed criminal liability on physicians who failed to
meet certain standards for performing abortions and providing abortion-related
information. See id. at 58-60.
75 Id. at 61.
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lenge the Seventh Circuit's decision. 76 The Court noted that if the
State of Illinois had sought review, Diamond would have had the "ability to ride 'piggyback' on the State's undoubted standing" and therefore could have remained as a valid party to the appeal. 77 Without the
State, however, the Court held that Diamond could only appeal "upon
a showing by the intervenor that he fulfill[ed] the requirements of
Art[icle] III. '' 7 8 However, neither the interests that Diamond listed in

his original petition to intervene-being a conscientious objector to
abortions, a general physician, and a father of a daughter of
childbearing years7 9-nor the fact that the district court had assessed
attorney's fees against him were sufficient to confer an independent
basis for standing in the dispute.8 0
In its analysis, the Court acknowledged the "anomalous decisions" of the courts of appeals regarding the relationship between the
interest required for intervention as of right under Rule 24(a) (2) and
the interest required under Article III standing81 The Court, however, declined to address that specific issue, finding it unnecessary to
the determination that parties must possess standing in order to make
82
an independent appeal.
76
77
78
79
80

Id.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 64-67.
Id. at 70-71 ("Art[icle] III standing requires an injury with a nexus to the sub-

stantive character of the statute or regulation at issue ....

Any liability for fees is, of

course, a consequence of Diamond's decision to intervene, but it cannot fairly be
traced to the Illinois Abortion Law.").
81 Id. at 68.
82 Id. at 68-69; see also id. at 74 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) ("Like the Court, I find it unnecessary to decide that question,
because the challenge to Diamond's standing subsumes a challenge to the sufficiency
of his interest as an intervenor for purposes of Rule 24."). Because of Dr. Diamond's
"atypical procedural posture," Karastelev, supra note 38, at 463, confusion remains
regarding the type of interest required to intervene, which has led commentators to
cite Diamond on both sides of the argument. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 15, at 441
("[I] n Diamond, the majority's phrasing of the relevant question as whether applicants
'must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a) (2), but also the requirements of
Article III,' and its observation that Dr. Diamond might have relied on the state's
standing, had Illinois chosen to appeal, could be endorsements of intervention at the
trial court level by entities without standing." (quoting Diamond, 476 U.S. at 69));
Hutchings, supra note 14, at 714 ("Diamond seems to stand for the proposition that
applicants must be able to claim a right protected under some law before they can
satisfy the interest requirement of Rule 24(a) (2)."); White, supra note 14, at 543
("[Diamonds] black letter rule remains one of the strongest arguments in favor of
standing to intervene.").
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Bowsher and Beyond

During the same Term as Diamond, the Court developed the Bowsher doctrine-a doctrine applied initially to standing generally, but
later expanded to encompass intervention as well. In Bowsher v.
Synar,83 the Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to Congress' delegation of several functions to the Comptroller General under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,84 which
was created to reduce the deficit in part through suspending certain
cost-of-living benefit increases for union members. 85 Members of
Congress, the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), and a
member of the NTEU brought suit alleging that the delegation of
congressional powers to the Comptroller General violated the separation of powers.8 6 After establishing that members of NTEU would be
injured by not receiving their benefit increases and had standing to
sue, the Court held that it "therefore need not consider the standing
issue as to the [NTEU] or Members of Congress" and kept all of the
parties in the suit.8 7 This holding has become known as the Bowsher

doctrine and stands for the proposition that the Court will not analyze
whether each individual party has standing to bring a claim, but will
only ensure that one of the moving parties can meet the standing
requirements. 88
The Court explicitly applied the Bowsher doctrine to intervention
in 2003 in McConnell v. FE0 9 when it refused to analyze the standing
of the defendant-intervenors where the Federal Election Commission
(FEC) clearly had standing as a defendant since it was charged with
enforcing the Act at issue. 90 In McConnell, the Court generally upheld
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002,91 which had
been attacked on numerous constitutional grounds, 9 2 in a complex
83

478 U.S. 714 (1986).

84 Pub. L. No. 99-177, tit. II, 99 Stat. 1038 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 901-922 (2006)), invalidatedin part by Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714.
85 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 717-19.
86 Id. at 719-21 & n.2.
87 Id. at 721.
88 See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S.
47, 52 n.2 (2006).
89 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
90 Id. at 233.
91 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
2 and 47 U.S.C.).
92 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 171, 173, 184, 233.
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case involving over ninety separate parties.9 3 The district court
allowed various members of Congress, who were the "principal sponsors and authors of BCRA," to intervene as defendants in order to
support the constitutionality of the Act.9

4

In affirming the district

court's decision to allow this defendant intervention, the Court stated:
"It is clear.., that the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has standing, and therefore we need not address the standing of the intervenor95
defendants, whose position here is identical to the JEC's."

While the Supreme Court has wavered with regard to what constitutes a sufficient interest to warrant intervention, the Court appears to
have developed a liberal stance to the rule. Notwithstanding this liberal approach, however, the Court has implicitly suggested some possible limits to the doctrine. In Diamond, an intervenor was only able to
"piggyback" into the suit when a party with standing remained actively
involved in litigation. 9 6 This suggests that intervenors might be limited in their ability to bring certain claims and take independent
action in the suit. Additionally, the Court in McConnell specifically
noted that the defendant intervenors had a position identical to that
of a party with standing in the suit, again suggesting limits on the
rights of potential intervenors regarding both the ability to intervene
and the ability to act once the application for intervention has been
granted.
IV.

How

LOWER COURTS AND COMMENTATORS HAVE ADDRESSED
THE ISSUE

97

As an initial matter, one must ask whether the issue regarding the
relationship between intervention and standing has become moot.
Based on the Bowsher doctrine, the Supreme Court will likely allow
intervention without even addressing standing as long as the inter93 See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 220-27 & n.55 (D.D.C. 2003) (providing information about the parties to the litigation), affd in part, rev'd in part, 540
U.S. 93.
94 Id. at 227.
95 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 233 (emphasis added) (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 721 (1986)). While the Court's language regarding the identical claims is potentially a limit on the Bowsher doctrine, Part V, infra, analyzes just how "identical" these
positions likely were.
96 See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
97 Courts and commentators have analyzed the relationship between intervention
and standing numerous times throughout the years. As a result, this Note will not
attempt to rewrite all of the previous scholarship, but will instead focus on the most
relevant cases and arguments. For superb overviews of the history and
implementation of Rule 24(a), see Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation:
The EnvironmentalParadigm,78

WASH.

U. L.Q. 215 (2000), and Shapiro, supra note 54.
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venor is joining a side where a party has already established its Article
III standing. As a result, an intervenor must only point to one other
party on its side of the dispute to "piggyback" on the original party's
standing into the federal court. This means that in a case involving
dozens of original parties with several potential intervenors, likely only
one plaintiff must possess the adequate standing to bring an original
claim in a federal court.
Additionally, the number of standing cases that confronts the
Supreme Court is relatively small at the outset since standing and
intervention are factual, threshold determinations for the lower courts
to which higher courts often accord great deference. 98 This small subset of cases available for disposition is only decreased by the fact that
in many cases the intervenor's interest in the suit will satisfy both
intervention and standing requirements. 99 As a result, the overlap of
the standing and intervention interests and the extension of the Bowsher doctrine to at least some intervention situations reduce the
chance that a case clearly framing the matter will be presented before
the Supreme Court in the near future.
The issue, however, is by no means moot. First, lower courts
responsible for crafting relief for the parties and determining who is
bound by its judgments recognize the standing/intervention interest
dispute as a live matter. 10 0 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has left
open avenues through which cases raising the issue could be heard on
certiorari. For example, considering the Court's history of imposing
limits on intervenors, must an intervenor show independent standing
in order to bring different claims, arguments, or different goals to the
dispute? What exactly is the relationship between standingless intervention under Bowsher and placing limits on the role that the inter-

98 See, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129,
135 (1967) ("'[T]he circumstances under which interested outsiders should be
allowed to become participants in a litigation is, barring very special circumstances, a
matter for the nisi prius court.'" (quoting Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United
States, 312 U.S. 502, 506 (1941))); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp.,
749 F.2d 968, 991 (2d Cir. 1984) (discussing the relevant abuse of discretion standard
for intervention decisions based on "the great variety of factual circumstances in
which intervention motions must be decided, the necessity of having the 'feel of the
case' in deciding these motions, and other considerations essential under a flexible
reading of Rule 24(a) (2)").
99 See infta Part IV.B.
100 See, e.g., Dillard v. Chilton County Comm'n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1337 n.10 (l1th
Cir. 2007) (noting the circuit split over the issue); Brook Vill. N. Assocs. v. Jackson,
No. 06-cv-046-JD, 2006 WL 3308328, at *4 (D.N.H. Nov. 13, 2006) (same).

200 9 ]

STANDING

AND

INTERVENTION

AS

OF RIGHT

1427

venor can play in the suit? 10 1 Additionally, if an original party
dropped out of a suit during trial and the intervenor did not have
Article III standing, could the intervenor continue the suit without the
aid of the original party if the trial court had allowed intervention
based on the original party's standing? 0 2 Is this situation factually
distinct from Diamond, in which the defendant intervenor attempted
to independently appeal a suit, allowing for a more lenient application of the standing requirements? The struggles of the lower courts
to respectively define the interests required for intervention and
standing, as discussed below,10 3 and the important issues yet
unresolved provide evidence that the standing/intervention issue is a
live dispute. The Court should strive to settle the disagreement whenever possible in order to ensure that the constitutional mandates of
standing and the goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
being given the appropriate weight and applied accordingly.
Both before and after Supreme Court recognition in the Diamond
decision, the circuits have disagreed decidedly about the requisite
interest for intervention as of right under Rule 24(a) (2). However,
while "U] udicial articulation of the interest requirement ranges across
a broad spectrum," I0 4 three general categories of interpreting the
standing/intervention relationship emerge after an analysis of the
various circuit holdings: standing is required for intervention as of
right, standing is not required for intervention as of right, and the
requirements of standing and the interest requirements of Rule
24(a) (2) intervention are equivalent. These classifications generally
serve as bright-line rules for the courts, which follow the circuit classi05
fications no matter the interests or posture of the parties involved.1
A strong minority of the commentators agrees with those courts
that require intervenors to possess standing in order to preserve the
Article III case or controversy before it. They further assert that Diamonds restriction of appeals to individuals with standing raises due
process concerns for standingless intervenors who participate at the
trial court level but are denied independent appeals. A majority of
the commentators weighing in on the issue has concluded that stand101

See Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting

that Bowsher does not instruct lower courts about how to view the relationship
between intervention and standing when an intervenor seeks to block settlement or
receive attorneys' fees and is therefore "not simply along for the ride").

102 The argument for the rest of this Note assumes that the original Article III
parties remain parties to the suit.
103 See infra Part IV.A-B.
104 Tobias, supra note 15, at 434.
105 See infra Part IV.A-B.
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ing should not be required of potential intervenors. These commentators focus on the distinction between initiating and joining a suit
and attack the assumption that intervenors are always acting on equal
footing with the original parties. Additionally, several courts have
noted that, at least practically, the interests required for standing and
intervention are equivalent.' 0 6 These three categories will be
addressed in turn.
A.

The Requisite Interests for Standing and Intervention Are Different

While circuits have changed position over time, prior to McConnell, the circuits had generally adopted one of two bright-line rules:
standing was required for intervention as of right or standing was not
required for intervention as of right. Prior to McConnell's extension of
the Bowsher doctrine to intervention as of right, the Eighth, District of
Columbia, and possibly Fourth Circuits required standing for potential plaintiff intervenors. 10 7 Since McConnell, but without ever citing
McConnell, these circuits have become silent on the issue, leaving their
respective district courts in confusion. The Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, Eleventh, and possibly the Second and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand,
have remained true to their pre-McConnell positions that standing is
not required for intervention, again without ever citing McConnell."18
While the circuits that required standing of potential intervenors
prior to McConnell now seem uncertain about the validity of their
prior holdings, this Note argues that Bowsher and McConnell in fact
support a requirement of standing for some intervenors. As discussed
in the next Part, this Note counsels against bright-line rulesdemanding intervenor standing in all cases or never requiring standing at all-that ignore the claims and/or interests that intervenors
seek to introduce to the dispute. Instead, this Note supports a procedure that injects flexibility into the analysis, as imagined by the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules, but is limited so as to preserve the
integrity of constitutional standing concerns not contemplated by
Bowsher and its progeny.
106 See supra note 6.
107 See infra Part W.A.1.
108 See infra Part IV.A.2. Some commentators argue that there are at least six different categories of classification used by the lower courts, covering a spectrum of
interest-requirement levels for intervention. See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42
STAN. L. REV. 227, 251 (1990). For the purposes of this Note, however, I have simply
grouped the various classifications into three broader categories: (1) the interest
levels for standing and intervention are equivalent, (2) an independent standing
interest level is required for intervention, and (3) a non-standing interest level is necessary for intervention.
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1. Standing Is Required for Intervention
A strong minority of courts and commentators takes the position
that the interest required for standing is greater than that required
for intervention and serves as an independent requirement that intervenors must demonstrate before any application for intervention can
be considered. 0 9 The Eighth Circuit recognizes that "[a]n interest is
cognizable under Rule 24(a) (2) only where it is 'direct, substantial,
and legally protectable."'11 0 Additionally, prior to McConnell, the circuit repeatedly recognized that "[b]ecause an intervenor seeks to
become a 'suitor,' and asks the court to 'decide the merits of the dispute,"'" 1 "Article III standing is a prerequisite for intervention in a
federal lawsuit." 1 12 Allowing intervention by an intervenor without
Article III standing would therefore transform the disagreement from
an Article III case or controversy into a nonjusticiable dispute."13
While the circuit has not explicitly ruled on the relationship between
standing and intervention since McConnell, the circuit court has
declined to overrule its pre-McConnell precedent and has recognized
that the circuit's district courts still require standing of potential
intervenors.114
109 As of the writing of this Note, it is not entirely clear where the Fourth Circuit
generally falls on the issue; however, at least in the case of bankruptcy proceedings
prior to McConnell, the circuit required standing plus something more before
allowing intervention. See Richman v. First Woman's Bank (In re Richman), 104 F.Sd
654, 658 (4th Cir. 1997). Additionally, the Seventh Circuit has historically required
standing for intervention, but has more recently held that, pragmatically, the interests
required for standing and intervention as of right are equivalent. See infra note 169
and accompanying text.
110 Med. Liab. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alan Curtis LLC, 485 F.3d 1006, 1008 (8th Cir.
2007) (quoting United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1161 (8th Cir. 1995)).
111 Mausolfv. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984)).
112 Standard Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 137 F.3d
567, 570 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Curry v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 167 F.3d 420,
422 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Standard Heatingfor the same proposition).
113 See South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1023-24 (8th Cir. 2003); see
also Mausoif, 85 F.3d at 1300 ("[A]n Article III case or controversy, once joined by
intervenors who lack standing, is-put bluntly-no longer an Article III case or
controversy.").
114 See, e.g., Med. Liab. Mut. Ins. Co., 485 F.3d at 1008-09 (upholding the district
court's denial of a motion to intervene where the potential intervenor did not have
standing); see also Seger v. Ernest-Spencer Metals, Inc., No. 8:08CV75, 2008 WL
3875302, at *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2008) (citing Curry, 167 F.3d at 422, and Medical
Liability Mutual Insurance Co., 485 F.3d at 1008, for the proposition that standing is
required for intervention); Sun Media Sys., Inc. v. N.Y. Television, Inc., No.
4:08CV00268 JMM, 2008 WL 2387325, at *1 (E.D. Ark. June 9, 2008) ("The Eighth
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Likewise, prior to McConnell, the D.C. Circuit generally required a
standing-level interest to satisfy the Rule 24(a) (2) interest for intervention.'1 5 According to the circuit, "the underlying rationale for
th[e] requirement [that the intervenor have standing] is clear:
because a Rule 24 intervenor seeks to participate on an equal footing
with the original parties to the suit, he must satisfy the standing
requirements imposed on those parties. ' 16 The circuit has recognized, however, that requiring a unilateral showing of standing gives
rise to "several thorny issues."'1 17 For example, there is a tension
between requiring standing for potential intervenors while, pursuant
to the Bowsher doctrine, generally finding Article III satisfied when
only one party has standing.' 8 Similarly, the court has recognized
that requiring a defendant-intervenor to establish standing "runs into
the doctrine that the standing inquiry is directed at those who invoke
the court's jurisdiction."1 1 9 Again, since McConnell, the circuit has
become largely silent on the issue,' 20 leaving the district courts to
interpret its pre-McConnell cases as good law. 12 1
Beyond the argument that allowing standingless intervenors to
act on equal footing as original parties destroys the case and controversy requirement of Article III, and thus provides an "end run[]
around Article III of the Constitution,"1 22 commentators have developed other arguments for requiring an independent basis of standing
for potential intervenors. Kerry White has argued that courts must
view standing as a doctrine concerned with each "party's relationship
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a party must have Article III standing in order
to intervene as a matter of right." (citing Curry, 167 F.3d at 422)); Animal Prot. Inst. v.
Merriam, 242 F.R.D. 524, 527 (D. Minn. 2006) ("Although Rule 24(a) does not
address standing, our Court of Appeals has held that a party must have Article III
standing in order to intervene as a matter of right." (citing Mausoif 85 F.3d at 1300;
Curry, 167 F.3d at 422)).
115 See, e.g., Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
("[D]ecisions of this court hold an intervenor must also establish its standing under
Article III .. ").
116 City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (emphasis added).
117 Jones v. Prince George's County, Md., 348 F.3d 1014, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
118 Id. (citing Roeder, 333 F.3d at 233).
119 Roeder, 333 F.3d at 233. Both of these concerns are addressed in Part V, infra.
120 But see City of Naples Airport Auth. v. FAA, No. 03-1308, 2004 WL 1080160, at
*1 (D.C. Cir. May 13, 2004) ("Intervenors must have standing under Article III of the
Constitution." (citing Roeder, 333 F.3d at 233)).
121 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 523 F. Supp. 2d 5, 9 (D.D.C. 2007); Nat'l
Ass'n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 519 F. Supp. 2d 89, 91-92
(D.D.C. 2007).
122 White, supra note 14, at 552.
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to the injury alleged." 12 3 Those courts interpreting standing as merely
"a threshold requirement with respect to each case," are, according to
White, therefore using a flawed definition of standing for the basis of
intervention. 124 In order to incorporate the ideas of practicality and
flexibility into a mandatory standing approach, White includes
"Potential Future Claimants"-individuals with a "concrete risk of
future injury" based on an unfavorable outcome in the initial suitinto the definition of standing. 125 Additionally, as a subset of the
Potential Future Claimaints, White includes defendant-intervenors
who are "merely defending an interest threatened by the existing
action" and would immediately possess standing to challenge an unfa126
vorable outcome of the present suit.

Another argument for requiring standing by potential intervenors is based on due process concerns stemming from Diamond. The
Court in Diamondheld that an independent appeal by an intervenor is
only allowed "upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the
requirements

of Art[icle]

III."127

Rodrick

Coffey

argues

that

"[b] ecause one of the fundamental rights of the American judicial
system is the right to appeal, it seems unfair to deny that right to an
intervenor who has been given party status at a trial."'128 According to
White, this inability to appeal binding judgments may also result in
inferior bargaining power at the settlement table, and the interests of
standingless intervenors "may be more impaired by their participation
123 Id. at 554.
124 Id. at 553-54 (emphasis omitted).
125 Id. at 556 (noting that allowing Potential Future Claimants to intervene also
promotes efficiency since "Potential Future Claimants pose the greatest risk of multiplying the amount of litigation in the federal courts due to reactive claims on virtually
identical issues"). White contrasts Potential Future Claimants with "Public Interest
Claimants"-individuals "represent[ing] the most problematic aspects in the rise of
public law litigation with respect to . . . Article III" since these individuals "will not
acquire standing by an unfavorable outcome." Id. at 556-57.

126

Id. at 560 (noting that "'[s]tanding is overwhelmingly a plaintiff's hurdle,'" as

justification for inclusion of individuals with otherwise prospective claims (quoting
Ellyn J. Bullock, Note, Acid Rain Falls on the Just and the Unjust: Why Standing's Criteria
Should Not Be Incorporated into Intervention of Right, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 605, 641)).
127 Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986).
128 Rodrick J. Coffey, Note, Giving a Hoot About an Owl Does Not Satisfy the Interest
Requirementfor Intervention: The Misapplication of Intervention as of Right in Coalition of
Arizona/New Mexico Counties for Stable Economic Growth v. Department of the
Interior, 1998 BYU L. REv. 811, 823; see also White, supra note 14, at 559 ("[T]he real
dilemma created by the Diamond case is that it allows for fully-recognized parties to be
bound by ajudgment with no avenue to appeal, while other allegedly co-equal parties
have that option. This result would seem to be a clear violation of due process.").
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in a suit than by ajudgment in their absence. 1 29 In order to prevent
this inequitable result, White and Coffey argue that the only options
are to push Diamonds jurisprudence a step further and require standing for all parties in an action' 30 or to overrule Diamond outright.1 3 1
2.

Standing Is Not Required for Intervention

After recognizing and analyzing the circuit split and confusion
produced by Diamond, a majority of circuit courts and commentators
have concluded that while an analysis of standing may be helpful to
determine whether an applicant satisfies the interest requirements of
Rule 24(a) (2), such an analysis should not be obligatory.
The Fifth Circuit, for example, recognizes that the "Article III
standing doctrine serves primarily to guarantee the existence of a
'case' or 'controversy'
appropriate for judicial determination and ... does not require each and every party in a case to have
such standing."'1 32 Therefore, once an Article III case or controversy
has been established, existing jurisdiction is not destroyed by the addition of parties that do not possess standing, even when these parties
seek to advance new arguments. 13 3 Similarly, relying on Trbovich v.
United Mine Workers, the Second Circuit has determined that "[t]he
existence of a case or controversy having been established as between
the [original parties], there [is] no need to impose the standing
13 4
requirement upon the proposed intervenor."'
129 White, supra note 14, at 559.
130 Coffey, supra note 128, at 823; White supra note 14, at 559. White concludes by
noting several remedies for individuals lacking standing: lobbying, state courts of general jurisdiction, amicus curiae briefs, permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b),
and limited intervention. White, supra note 14, at 560-62. White notes that permissive intervention and limited intervention still might provide an "end run around
Article III standing," yet argues that these options are "highly preferable to
allowing... full [standingless] participation." Id. at 561-62. But see Hutchings, supra
note 14, at 736 (" [A] lternatives to intervention ...are often inadequate because they
do not allow the litigant to conduct discovery, participate in the negotiation of a consent decree or introduce evidence supporting their position.").
131 See Coffey, supra note 128, at 823.
132 Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 832 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); see Newby
v. Enron Corp., 443 F.3d 416, 422 (5th Cir. 2006).
133 Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 832-33.
134 U.S. Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing Trbovich
v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 536-39 (1972)). The court ultimately did
deny intervention to the applicant, however, since it failed to show that its interest was
not represented adequately by the parties already involved in the suit. Id. at 191. In a
1993 case, the circuit affirmed a denial of intervention for "substantially the reasons"
stated by the lower court judge, who denied intervention since the party could not
show an independent basis for standing. See Orange Env't, Inc. v. Orange County
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The Sixth Circuit has held that proposed intervenors must show
that they have a substantial interest in the litigation, but has "subscribe[d] to a 'rather expansive notion of the interest sufficient to
invoke intervention as of right."' 13 5 Like the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth
Circuit has relied on the distinction between joining an established
Article III case or controversy as opposed to initiating1 3 6 or appealing 1 37 a lawsuit to allow participation by standingless intervenors.
Commentators argue that the Ninth Circuit is the most liberal
circuit with regard to allowing intervention.13 8 While the Ninth Circuit historically does not require an independent basis for standing
when considering an application for intervention,13 9 it remains
unclear exactly how liberally the circuit allows intervention post
McConnell.I 40 The circuit has argued that "the standing requirement
is at least implicitly addressed by [the Ninth Circuit's intervention]
requirement that the applicant must 'assert[] an interest relating to
the property or transaction which is the subject of the action.'"1'4 In
fact, because it considers the requirements for standing to be more
difficult to meet than the requirements for intervention, 14 2 the circuit
has historically used the standing doctrine to determine whether an
143
applicant has met the Rule 24(a) (2) interest burden.
Legislature, 2 F.3d 1235, 1236 (2d Cir. 1993). More recent intervention cases, however, have largely ignored standing, but have required a concrete intervention interest that is "'direct, substantial, and legally protectable."' E.g., Person v. N.Y. State Bd.
of Elections, 467 F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Peoples Benefit Life Ins. Co., 271 F.3d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 2001)).
135 Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Mich. State
AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1997)).
136 See Providence Baptist Church v. Hillandale Comm., Ltd., 425 F.3d 309, 315,
318 (6th Cir. 2005); Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d 941, 948 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing
Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 536-39).
137 See Associated Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 1994)
(citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986)).
138 See Tobias, supra note 15, at 434-35 (listing the Ninth Circuit at the most flexible end of the standing spectrum); White, supra note 14, at 545-46 (listing the Ninth
Circuit as the most liberal circuit regarding intervention, yet suggesting that the circuit requires "some level of legally cognizable interest before granting intervention").
139 Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 308 n.1 (9th Cir. 1989).
140 See Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 955 n.8 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that the
Ninth Circuit has not yet settled the issue of "whether an intervenor-applicant must
independently establish Article III standing to intervene as of right" despite the claims
of various sources).
141 Hode 866 F.2d at 308 n.1 (second alteration in original) (quoting County of
Orange v. Air Cal., 799 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1986)).
142 Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1991).
143 See, e.g.,
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 814, 821 n.3 (9th
Cir. 2001) (using associational standing as the basis for allowing intervention by the
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In 2005, after analyzing the circuit split, the Tenth Circuit sided
with those courts finding that Article III standing was not required for
intervenors. 144 The court based its position on the Diamond decision,
which made it "clear" that Diamond would have been able to appeal
the decision and file a brief on the merits despite lacking Article III
standing by riding "piggyback" on the original defendant who did possess standing. 14 5 This Tenth Circuit ruling was recently vacated, and
an en banc court held that the interests of the potential conservation
group intervenors were adequately represented by the federal government. I 46 Despite denying intervention, the court explicitly adopted
the original panel's reasoning on the relationship between standing
and intervention:
On rehearing en banc we adopt the panel's reasoning on this issue
and hold that parties seeking to intervene under Rule 24(a) or (b)
need not establish Article III standing "so long as another party with
constitutional standing on the same side as the intervenor remains
in the case." In that circumstance the federal court has a Case or
Controversy before it regardless of the standing of the
147
intervenor.
Additionally, while holding that a standing inquiry might be relevant to determining whether an interest under Rule 24(a) (2) is sufficient, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted the position that "a party
seeking to intervene need not demonstrate that he has standing in
addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 24 as long as there
exists ajusticiable case and controversy between the parties already in
the lawsuit"' 48-at least in the case where the claims being raised are
the same as those already at issue. 14 9 In so holding, the court noted
the distinction between the issues involved in bringing an original suit
Southwest Center for Biological Diversity in a suit involving claimed violations of the
Endangered Species Act); Yniguez, 939 F.2d at 735. Cindy Vreeland has championed
the incorporation of the doctrine of associational standing into Rule 24(a)(2)'s
requirements for public interest groups intervening in public law litigation. See Cindy
Vreeland, Comment, Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation, and FederalRule 24(a),
57 U. CHI. L. REv. 279, 303-05 (1990).
144 See San Juan County v. United States, 420 F.3d 1197, 1203-05 (10th Cir. 2005),
vacated on reh'g en banc, 503 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2007).
145 Id. at 1205 (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986)).
146 San Juan County v. United States, 503 F.3d 1163, 1167, 1207 (10th Cir. 2007).
The court also upheld the district court's denial of permissive intervention under
Rule 24(b). Id. at 1207.
147 Id. at 1172 (citations omitted) (quoting San Juan County, 420 F.3d at 1206).
148 Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. 1989).
149 Id. at 1213 n.17.
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versus intervention: "'When one seeks to intervene in an ongoing law' 150
suit, [justiciability] questions have presumably been resolved."
Like the circuit courts, commentators have noted the distinction
"between the question whether one is a proper plaintiff or defendant
in an initial action and the question whether one is entitled to intervene."' 15 1 In this view, standing is a threshold issue, requiring that the
original parties establish jurisdiction for the court to hear the case or
controversy, rather than analyzing each party's relationship to the case
or controversy. 152 Additionally, these commentators argue that since
standing is a "plaintiffs hurdle," requiring defendant-intervenors to
prove an Article III case or controversy is a misapplication of the
standing doctrine. 15 3 Some commentators argue that while standing
is not necessary for intervention it is still "crucial ... to the intervention inquiry" since the respective "interests" overlap, 154 while others
find the standing doctrine to be so "confused and complex [that it is]
15 5
not easily transferable to such a different area of the law."'
Other evidence cited for the proposition that standing is not necessary for intervention is Rule 19 (a) (1), which governs necessary joinder. 15 6 Pursuant to Rule 19(a) (1), the original parties must join
150 Id. at 1212 n.16 (alterations in original) (quoting Shapiro, supra note 54, at
726); see also Dillard v. Chilton County Comm'n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1336-37 (11th Cir.
2007) (citing Chiles for the proposition that intervention does not require a demonstration of standing where the original parties have already presented a justiciable

case or controversy).
151 Shapiro, supranote 54, at 726; see also Karastelev, supra note 38, at 471 ("Given
that the judicial machinery has already been mobilized, the consideration should be
whether the would-be intervenor's interests could be prejudiced by the pending case's
outcome and not whether he has standing to pursue a case of his own.").
152 See Tobias, supra note 15, at 428 (listing standing as a doctrine relating to the
commencement of litigation and intervention as a doctrine relating to participation
in litigation where the plaintiff has already proven standing); Karastelev, supra note
38, at 471-72.
153 Bullock, supra note 126, at 641-42 (arguing that the application of standing to
defendant intervenors is a "gigantic extension" of the doctrine); see also Appel, supra
note 97, at 285-86 ("[T]he question of standing-at least as to the injury-in-fact
inquiry-focuses entirely on the plaintiff." (footnote omitted)). But see McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003) (examining the standing of defendant FEC and defendant-intervenors).
154 Tobias, supra note 15, at 446 (suggesting that the policies that underlie both
standing and intervention argue for courts to focus primarily on the quality of potential intervenors' contributions to issue resolution).
155 Bullock, supra note 126, at 643.
156 See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (1). Karastelev also generally cites permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b) for the proposition that the involvement of parties without standing does not destroy an Article III case or controversy. Karastelev, supranote
38, at 473. Instead, the Rule "exists precisely to accommodate those parties who do
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necessary outsiders, and the language used in the Rule is almost identical to that in Rule 24(a) (2).157 While noting that the procedural
rights to intervention as of right and necessaryjoinder were developed
to be counterparts of each other, the 1966 Advisory Committee failed
to define the respective "interest" required for each rule. 158 Despite
the similar language of the two rules and the identical "interest" ambiguity, however, commentators note that Rules 24(a) and 19(a)(1)
have been treated differently by the courts 159 and that no courts have
explicitly required standing of individuals joining a lawsuit pursuant
not have standing and do not have a sufficient interest to intervene as of right." Id.
Furthermore, courts have used the Rule to allow intervention in a suit in some cases
where the intervenor could not meet the more stringent requirement of intervention
as of right. See, e.g., Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1967). As discussed
below, this Note does not take the position that standing by all parties is necessary for
the maintenance of an Article III case or controversy. See infra Part V. Instead, this
Note focuses on how the courts should apply the "interest" requirement of Rule
24(a) (2) to properly promote the judicial goals of intervention. Common sense
argues that intervention as of fight should be granted more stringently than permissive intervention. See Vreeland, supra note 143, at 309 ("[T]here is a difference
between flexibility in allowing intervention under Rule 24(b) and flexibility in limiting intervention under Rule 24(a)."). As a result, this Note will merely contend that
while permissive intervention is a very strong argument for the proposition that Article III standing is not necessary for every individual participant in every suit, it does
not aid in the determination of what level of "interest" should be required for intervention as of right. See id. (noting that collapsing the two rules into one might actually work against public interest group intervenors by "establish[ing] a presumption
that the public interest group may not belong in the litigation").
157 See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i). The Rule reads, in pertinent part:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not
deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if:
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action
and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect
the interest ....
Id.
158 See Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States
District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 73, 109-10 (1966) (advisory committee's note to Rule 24);
see also Appel, supra note 97, at 254 (asserting that the Rules were meant to be
counterparts).
159 See Shapiro, supra note 54, at 757 (correctly hypothesizing that the Rules would
be treated differently by federal courts); Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights
Exception to PartyJoinder,65 N.C. L. REv. 745, 746-70 (1987) (noting the limited practicality of using Rule 19 in a public rights context); Karastelev, supra note 38, at 472-73
(noting the similarity between the language of the two rules). Note that the above
authors refer to Rule 19(a)(2)(i) rather than Rule 19(a)(1), as their articles were
written before the 2007 amendments to Rule 19.
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to Rule 19.160 Based on the text and history of Rules 24(a) and 19,
Karastelev concludes that Rule 24(a) should follow the established
jurisprudence of Rule 19 and courts should stop demanding that
intervenors prove that they have standing to sue.1 61 Others argue that
Rule 19 is applied by courts in a narrower context than Rule 24(a)
162
and in fact in a manner that "implicitly includes standing."'
Finally, commentators also attack the assumption that intervenors
are necessarily coequal parties to the litigation. 163 While the language
of Rule 24(a) (2) "does not anticipate conditioning participation of
intervenors as of right," the 1966 Advisory Committee notes make
clear that judges are free to use their discretion to limit the participation of intervenors. I64 These limits can be used to subordinate the
intervenor to the original parties, explicitly putting the parties on unequal footing and possibly justifying different threshold standards for
entry into the suit. The use of discretion to properly limit participation can also be used to overcome the efficiency concerns presented
by complex public law litigation-allowing intervention by public
160 See Karastelev, supra note 38, at 472-73.
161 Id.
162 See White, supranote 14, at 539 & n.71 (arguing that Rule 19 is applied much
more narrowly by the courts than Rule 24 and "implicitly includes standing"); see also
Appel, supra note 97, at 258-59 ("[T]o the extent that the Advisory Committee saw
intervention as simply a complement to joinder, the right to intervene now exceeds
instances in which joinder would apply.").
163 See Karastelev, supra note 38, at 475. Despite requiring standing for intervention, the Seventh Circuit has recently noted that individuals need not always participate on equal footing as other parties, yet questioned whether this is still
"intervention" under Rule 24(a). See Korczak v. Sedeman, 427 F.3d 419, 421-22 (7th
Cir. 2005).
164 Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 73, 111 (1966) (advisory committee's note to Rule 24) ("An
intervention of right under the amended rule may be subject to appropriate conditions or restrictions responsive among other things to the requirements of efficient
conduct of the proceedings."); see also Appel, supra note 97, at 278 (noting that "the
committee provided no authority" for its statement that courts had the authority to
limit intervention). Many courts have exercised this discretion. See Vreeland, supra
note 143, at 307 ("[C]ourts have limited the issues that an intervenor may raise,
denied intervenors the right to ajury trial, limited intervention to a particular stage of
the trial, and required that multiple intervenors use restricted numbers of spokesmen
and combine discovery and motion presentations."); see also Tobias, supranote 15, at
450 (listing excluding duplicitous data, restricting pretrial involvement, and limiting
issue involvement as methods for limiting intervenor participation); Karastelev, supra
note 38, at 481-83 (noting the number of options that courts have for "proactively
limiting the potential disruption to an ongoing case by the addition of an intervenor,
without blocking his participation completely").
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interest litigants who are experts in the subject of the litigation while
165
ensuring that the case does not become unwieldy for the court.
B.

The Interests Are Equivalent

Other courts argue that the interests required for standing and
intervention are essentially equivalent for most cases, as a result of the
comparative goals advanced by each. 166 The First Circuit, for example, has noted that "in the ordinary case, an applicant who satisfies the
'interest' requirement of the intervention rule is almost always going
to have a sufficient stake in the controversy to satisfy Article III as
well.'

67

The court did note, however, that standing is a complex doc-

trine and that in unusual circumstances, the overlap between the
standing interest and the intervention interest may not always be complete.' 68 Similarly, while historically requiring an independent showing of Article III standing before allowing intervention, the Seventh
Circuit has generally recognized that "[f]rom a pragmatic standpoint... '[a] ny interest of such magnitude [as to support Rule 24(a)
intervention of right] is sufficient to satisfy the Article III standing
requirement as well.'"

169

165 SeeAppel, supranote 97, at 295; Tobias, supra note 15, at 419; Hutchings, supra
note 14, at 695, 733-34.
166 See supra note 6 for a discussion of the term "equivalent" for the purpose of
this Note; supra notes 3-5, 11-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the goals
promoted by intervention; and supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the goals promoted by standing.
167 Cotter v. Mass. Ass'n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers, 219 F.3d 31,
34 (1st Cir. 2000); see also White, supra note 14, at 531, 536 (noting that in private
disputes under the traditional litigation model, the interest requirements of standing
and intervention as of right will generally overlap, but that this is often not the case in
public law litigation where "no specific cause of action has been granted to a group or
individual party alleging injury").
168 Cotter, 219 F.3d at 34.
169 Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 2000) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Transamerica Ins. Co. v. South, 125
F.3d 392, 396 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997)). The Seventh Circuit has fluctuated greatly on the
matter of the relationship between the respective interests of standing and intervention. In 1972, the circuit stated that the "requirements for intervention . . .should
generally be more liberal than those for standing to bring suit." United States v. Bd.
of Sch. Comm'rs, 466 F.2d 573, 577 (7th Cir. 1972) (citing Shapiro, supra note 54, at
726). Later, but before the tightening of standing in Lujan, the circuit developed the
view that an applicant for intervention must show a direct, substantial, and legally
protectable interest greater than the interest required to satisfy standing. See United
States v. 39.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1985). Since McConnell, the
circuit has adopted a more liberal form of intervention that does not require stand-
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This relationship between standing and intervention results from
the overlapping goals that both doctrines seek to accomplish, despite
their different purposes. 70 Both standing and intervention promote
efficiency in the judicial process by limiting the number of suits
brought into the courts. By allowing intervenors to participate when
their interests relate to the property or transaction at issue, courts are
able to reduce the number of original suits while potentially making
decisions that benefit from the increased participation of individuals
and organizations with varying positions. Furthermore, the timeliness
and inadequate representation requirements of Rule 24(a) inject discretion into an otherwise mandatory rule and allow courts to deny
intervention or limit participation where a potential intervenor might
actually reduce efficiency-for example, a large organization bringing
many new arguments that actually impede the interests of the other
parties and/or make the litigation prohibitively complex. 17 1 This discretion also facilitates standing's goal of concrete adverseness. By
allowing the optimal number of parties to be involved, the court can
take advantage of the education and resources of others to present
varying perspectives and ensure concrete adverseness-a sharpening
of the presentation of issues. When the court feels that the issues will
become too complicated and/or generalized, the discretion inherent
in Rule 24(a) (2) allows the court to limit participation in the
dispute.

172

Finally, both standing and intervention are concerned with the
value of fairness. Standing operates so as to ensure "outward" fairness-protecting the rights and concerns of individuals that have no
desire to become parties to the suit and do not seek judicial assistance. 173 Intervention, on the other hand, ensures "inward" fairing, yet has questioned whether this is true intervention under Rule 24(a). See
Korczak v. Sedeman, 427 F.3d 419, 421-22 (7th Cir. 2005).
170 But see Tobias, supra note 15, at 442 ("The history and judicial application of
standing and intervention of right show that they had different origins and were
intended to serve dissimilar, albeit not totally distinct, purposes."); Bullock, supra
note 126, at 640 (defining intervention as "a key to the courtroom, [and standing as]
a bar or lock").
171 See supra note 164 and accompanying text; see also White, supra note 14, at
555-56 ("[T]he efficiency argument breaks down in the context of public law litigation where many parties do not, and will not, have standing to litigate their asserted
interests regardless of the outcome of the decision.").
172 This focus on discretion and the furtherance of concrete adverseness is championed by Tobias' case-specific approach that focuses primarily on "whether an applicant promises to help resolve issues that warrant consideration before the court
makes a decision on the merits of the dispute." Tobias, supra note 15, at 447.
173 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 33, at 62.
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ness-protecting those already involved in the suit and assisting those
wanting to become involved in the Suit. 174 Intervention, therefore,

allows those on the outside of a suit who desire judicial protection to
become involved while the requirements and discretion components
ensure that original parties are not unjustly deprived of the right of
structuring and controlling their own suits.
Despite all of the above similarities, there is one judicial value
promoted by standing with which intervention arguably interferes:
restricting the scope of judicial review in order to preserve the separation of powers. If the interests implicated by standing and intervention do not overlap, and standing is not required for intervenors,
more individuals will participate in claims and the scope of judicial
review will be potentially broadened. This problem has become more
acute with the relatively recent flood of public law litigation-leading
some to claim that liberal intervention interferes with "the democratic
process in the legislative and executive branches,"175 while others
argue that the floodgates can be managed by court discretion to limit
176
or condition the participation of intervenors.
Courts have disagreed about the constitutional implications of
allowing standingless intervenors to participate in a suit. A minority
of courts has required standing in order to prevent the destruction of
an Article III case or controversy before the court. The majority of
courts, on the other hand, has criticized those requiring standing,
pointing to other Federal Rules and the judge's discretion in limiting
participation for justification that the Rules do not contemplate an
injection of standing requirements into Rule 24(a) (2). There are
strong arguments, however, that in a significant number of cases the
interest required for intervention as of right will likewise satisfy Article
III requirements. As a result, a bright-line rule taking one position or
another might be overlooking the unique circumstances that prevent
177
an overlap of the similar interests.
V.

How

COURTS SHOULD TREAT POTENTIAL INTERVENORS

As recognized by the First and Seventh Circuits, the interests
required for intervention and standing will often be equivalent based
on the overlapping goals of the doctrines.1 78 Furthermore, since the
174
175
176
177
178

See Berger, supra note 13, at 65.
See White, supra note 14, at 557.
See Karastelev, supra note 38, at 481.
See infra Part V.
See supa Part IV.B.
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interest for standing is often seen as the more difficult to meet, 179 a
court finding that an intervenor can show that it would have been
independently able to bring the original claim is an easy decision for
the court with regard to the interest prong of the Rule 24(a) (2) test.
If a court determines that an intervenor does not have standing in the
underlying dispute, the court should determine whether the intervenor seeks to bring a claim or merely protect an interest. If an intervenor is bringing a new claim before the court, she should be
required to make a showing of standing since she is creating a minitrial for the tribunal to decide and therefore triggers the threshold
requirements of standing. For intervenors merely protecting their
interests in a defensive posture or seeking to bring claims identical to
those already presented by the original parties, the intervenors should
not be required to show an interest in the litigation rising to the level
of standing.
A.

Standing Is Not Required for All Interuenors

In Bowsher, the Supreme Court made clear that not all parties to a
dispute must have standing to participate in a lawsuit.18 0 As a result,
the Court has debunked the notion that parties without standing necessarily destroy an Article III case or controversy and has adopted a
view of standing as a threshold issue-ensuring that the original parties establish an Article III case or controversy for the court, rather
than requiring each participant to defend her individual relationship
to the dispute.1 8 1 Since the writing of most of the articles cited in this
Note, the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC adopted the Bowsher
doctrine with respect to intervention.1 8 2 As a result, the Court has
firmly established that standing is not necessary for all intervenors.
The McConnell Court did potentially limit the application of the Bowsher doctrine, however, to intervenors whose positions are "identical"
to those of a party on the same side of the suit in which they are
1 83
seeking to intervene.
While limiting McConnell's holding to intervenors with "identical"
interests, the Court did not define what types of positions qualify as
179 See, e.g., Cotter v. Mass. Ass'n of Minority Law Enforcement Officers, 219 F.3d
31, 34 (1st Cir. 2000); Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1991).
180 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986).
181 The Court has therefore rejected White's view of standing as an examination
of each "party's relationship to the injury alleged" and adopted the threshold inquiry
that White criticized. See White, supra note 14, at 553-54 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 99 (1968)).
182 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003).
183 Id.
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identical under the Bowsher doctrine. An analysis of the parties
involved in McConnell, however, suggests that the term likely has a
broader meaning than its colloquial use, particularly considering the
requirement that the intervenors' interests cannot be adequately represented by the existing parties. 18 4 In McConnell, the Court allowed
six members of Congress, who were the principal sponsors and
authors of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, to intervene
as defendants to support the constitutionality of the Act since their
collective position was "identical" to the FEC's. 185 It is true that the
members of Congress, like the FEC, wanted the Supreme Court to
hold that the Act was constitutional; however, their interests and motivations in the matter were likely not identical to those of the FEC.
The FEC was in charge of enforcing the provision; 8 6 thus, the Act
required activity on the part of the FEC to determine those groups or
individuals in violation of the statute, proceed with investigations
against them, and bring suit.' 8

7

The members of Congress, on the

other hand, as members of the legislative branch, could take no active
part in the enforcement of the provision. Furthermore, their interests
in upholding the Act more likely involved concern with election
reform, pride in their work product, time and money devoted to getting the Act passed, avoidance of conflicts with lobbyists and constituents that pushed for the Act, political pressures, and reelection
concerns.1 81 Based on the disparate motivations and stakes in the litigation, by "identical positions," the Court probably meant the protection of the same interest-the constitutionality of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act-and nothing more.
The Supreme Court's Trbovich decision supports applying the
"identical position" limitation to intervenors attempting to bring different claims before the court. In Trbovich, the Court allowed standingless intervention, yet limited the intervenor's claims to those set forth
in the Secretary of Labor's complaint.1 8 9 In his petition for intervention, Trbovich presented two additional claims for setting aside the
184 See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). If the potential intervenor's interest in the litigation
were truly "identical" to the existing parties' interests, the intervenor would struggle
to show that those interests were represented inadequately in the suit, as required by
Rule 24(a). See id.
185 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 233. The seventeen defendants included Senator John
McCain. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 220 n.55 (D.D.C. 2003), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
186 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 227.
187 See 2 U.S.C.A. § 43 7 g (West 2005 & Supp. 2008).
188 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 227 (noting the reelection dates of several of the
defendant intervenors).
189 Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1972).
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disputed union election under the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 in addition to his arguments and evidence in
support of the Secretary's position.' 90 While recognizing that it was
"less burdensome for the union to respond to new claims in the context of the pending suit than it would be to respond to a new and
independent complaint," the Court determined that allowing these
additional claims would "circumvent the screening function assigned
by statute to the Secretary."' 191 The Court did note, however, that if
the district court ordered a new election, the Court was not limited to
those remedies proposed by the Secretary, as "there is no reason to
prevent the intervenors from assisting the court in fashioning a suitable remedial order."' 9 2 As a result, the limitation detailed in McConnell for protecting interests can be expanded to prevent intervenors
from bringing claims before the court, but it likely does not limit
93
intervenors in their suggestion to the court of certain remedies.'
Again, "identical positions" is not used in a colloquial sense-the
Court noted the different arguments, evidence, and motivations
presented by the intervenor that led the Court to conclude that Trbovich's interests were not adequately represented by the Secretary of
Labor. 194

In order to recognize the broad definition of "identical," yet
respect the limit incorporated by the Supreme Court, courts should
interpret the phrase "identical positions," as meaning either an identical claim in a plaintiffs posture (Trbovich) or protecting an identical
right or interest in a defensive posture (McConnell). Defining the
scope of a claim has consistently troubled courts, at least in the con190 Id. at 529-30 & n.2 ("Petitioner alleged as additional violations of the Act (1)
that the Union required members to vote in certain locals, composed entirely of pensioners, which petitioner claims are illegally constituted under the UMWA Constitution; and (2) that the incumbent president improperly influenced the pensioners'
vote by bringing about a pension increase just before the election.").
191 Id. at 537. While the Court was engaging in statutory interpretation in Trbovich, limiting standingless intervenors to claims presented by parties with standing is a
logical step based on McConnell, as bringing claims in court is more aggressive than
merely protecting interests.
192 Id. at 537 n.8.
193 See id. at 530, 537-38. The issue is beyond the scope of this Note, but based on
its ultimate conclusion that individuals seeking to bring new claims into the suit
should be required to show that they have standing to bring the new claim and that
the claim meets the interest requirements of Rule 24(a), one might argue that certain
requests for individualized remedies are in fact new claims as they require the court to
begin a new mini-trial to determine the intervenor's relationship to the underlying
dispute.
194 See id. at 530, 537-39.
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text of determining whether a party is precluded from bringing a
claim; 195 however the task at hand is alleviated by the fact that a court
can compare the intervenor's claim with that of the original party in
real time rather than retrospectively. Additionally, the court can
always use its discretion to limit or expand the involvement of the
intervenor later in the suit if it feels that its initial judgment was
incorrect.
B.

The Various Positions of Intervenors

In Trbovich and McConnell, the Court seemed concerned with limiting intervenors with no independent basis for standing to arguing
those claims brought by the original parties. Juliet Karastelev has
noted the importance of making a distinction between bringing a
claim and protecting an interest. 196 This distinction, however, must
account for the blurring that can occur between parties-defendants
can bring claims through counterclaims and cross-claims, and plaintiffs, in turn, can protect interests by defending against such claims. 19 7
Combining the positions of the parties with the "identical interest"
limitation discussed above, therefore, suggests four possible positions
of intervenors: (1) an intervenor seeking to protect interests that are
the same as those of the same-side party with standing, (2) an intervenor seeking to bring claims that are the same as those of the sameside party with standing, (3) an intervenor seeking to protect interests
that are different from those of the same-side party with standing, and
(4) an intervenor seeking to bring claims that are different from those
of the same-side party with standing. 9 8
1. Standing Not Required
The above discussion of McConnell and Trbovich suggests that
courts are free to grant intervention to the first two categories of intervenors. Merely because courts are free to grant intervention, however,
does not necessarily mean that they should grant full party rights to
195 See FREER & PERDUE, supra note 16, at 591.
196 See Karastelev, supra note 38, at 479-80.
197 See FREER & PERDUE, supra note 16, at 666-75.
198 Judge Friendly, who once agreed that there were a "'multitude of possible
intervention situations,"' might take issue with such a simplified four-category view of
the possible intervenor positions. See United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp.,
749 F.2d 968, 983 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Restor-A-Dent Dental Labs., Inc. v. Certified Allied Prods., Inc., 725 F.2d 871, 875 (2d Cir. 1984)).
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standingless intervenors. 199 Instead, courts must keep in mind the

goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: ensuring "the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination" of actions.2 00 The court can
use its discretion to tailor roles for specific applicants-for example, it
can limit participation to certain parts of the suit. Additionally, when
a party is seeking to protect the same interests or bring the same
claims as parties already involved in the suit, the court can take a
stricter view toward the inadequate representation requirement, forcing standingless intervenors to make a heightened showing that their
interests are not adequately represented by the existing parties to the
suit. 20

Additionally, the Court should allow standingless intervention to

applicants in the third category-those intervenors, whether plaintiffs
or defendants, defensively seeking to protect interests that are not

represented by the original parties.2 0 2 This is likely the most controversial argument in this Note, since the Trbovich Court explicitly lim20 3
ited Trbovich's claims to those in the Secretary's complaint.
199 See Tobias, supra note 15, at 448-49; see also Appel, supra note 97, at 281 (noting that courts allowing intervention by intervenors merely making the same arguments as original parties may become overwhelmed and thus sacrifice the efficiency
concerns of the Federal Rules). It is odd, however, to grant courts discretion to deny
intervention as of right based on these concerns, as that would appear to collapse
intervention of right and permissive intervention into one category. Instead, this
Note suggests that such a balancing act should be performed after the intervenor has
been allowed into the suit, assuming that the intervenor is able to meet the other
requirements of Rule 24(a).

200

FED.

R. Civ. P. 1.

201 See, e.g., Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leavitt, 488 F.3d 904, 910 (11th Cir. 2007) (placing
the burden on intervenors to produce evidence that the intervenors' interests are not
adequately represented "'when an existing party seeks the same objectives as the
would-be interven[o]rs"' (quoting Clark v. Putnam County, 168 F.3d 458, 461 (lth
Cir. 1999))); Appel, supranote 97, at 273 ("The most difficult case to find inadequate
representation is when an intervenor is seeking the same ultimate result as an original
party.").
202 Take, for example, a hypothetical situation where the Congress of the United
States passes a law mandating homosexual civil unions, and a Christian family group
sues, challenging the law as outside of the power of the federal government to mandate such unions. The government defends on due process grounds. A gay rights
group seeks to intervene as defendants in the suit and to have the statute upheld on
equal protection grounds in order to set an equal protection precedent for the treatment of homosexuals. This Note takes the position that the gay rights group should
be allowed to intervene and introduce the new defense to the suit, even if the group
would not have "defendant standing."
203 I am tempted to argue that the McConnell Court's view of "identical" interests
would be broad enough to encompass the gay rights group discussed in the hypothetical, supra note 202, since the group seeks the same end as the government-uphold-
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However, as the intervenor in the third instance is not seeking to

bring a claim and is instead "merely defending an interest threatened
by the existing action," it is unlikely that a defendant intervenor would
even be "capable of framing [her] asserted interests in such a way as
to confer standing to sue."20 4 In fact, many courts seem to assume
that intervenors must seek to protect different interests in order to
20 5
satisfy the inadequate representation requirement of Rule 24(a),
and courts and commentators specifically note the general impracticality of requiring defendants (or those in a defensive posture) to
show standing. 20 6 Again, the court can use its discretion to limit the
intervenor's participation in the rare case that such participation
might indirectly result in a new claim before the court, such as in the
case where an intervenor raises a new defense that in turn results in a
new claim. The Court's adoption of standing as a threshold issue,
focused primarily on plaintiffs who are asking the court to decide the
merits of a specific claim, means that intervenors seeking to protect
different interests need not demonstrate standing to intervene in an
already existing case or controversy.
Commentators, relying on the implications from Diamond,argue
that standing is a requirement of intervention as of right because of
the due process concerns of freely allowing standingless intervenors
into litigation. The commentators claim that there are only two
means of remedying the due process concerns of denying the right to
ing the constitutionality of the homosexual civil union statute. The district court in
McConnell unfortunately did not parse out the arguments introduced by each of the
various parties, likely because the suit involved seventy-seven plaintiffs and seventeen
defendants after the deadline for intervention. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d
197, 220 n.55 (2003 D.D.C.).
204 White, supra note 14, at 560. But see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 233
(2003) (examining the standing of defendant FEC and defendant-intervenors).
205 See, e.g., Leavitt, 488 F.3d at 910; California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450
F.3d 436, 443-44 (9th Cir. 2006); Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336, 342-44
(6th Cir. 1990).
206 See, e.g.,
Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 1979); Appel, supra note
97, at 285-86 ("The standing inquiry usually focuses on a plaintiff and 'whether the
plaintiff has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" as to
warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the
court's remedial powers on his behalf.' . . . A defendant need not prove standing to
sue, and a person wishing to intervene as a defendant might have a concrete interest
in the case but lack standing." (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99
(1975))); Bullock, supra note 126, at 641-42 ("Standing is overwhelmingly a plaintiffs
hurdle. Standing's requirements focus on the party bringing the action, and the
action being brought. The only standing requirement that implicates defendants is
causation, and there defendants are implicated only peripherally

omitted)); White, supra note 14, at 560.
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appeal to parties that are bound by a judgment: (1) requiring standing of all individuals seeking to intervene in a suit or (2) overruling
Diamond.20 7 There is a third option, however, that has been adopted
by at least one court: refusing to bind parties to a decision if they are
not given the right to appeal an unfavorable decision. 20 8 Additionally,
problems with the first two solutions abound: First, the Court has
already made clear that standing is not a requirement for all intervenors. 20 9 Second, overruling Diamond would not solve the due process
problem, but instead shift it onto the original parties to the suit-a
shift that is arguably even more unfair to the original party than to any
intervenor. 2 10 As Professor Appel explains, allowing standingless
intervenors to appeal an unfavorable decision can unfairly bind an
original party through stare decisis:
If the intervenor appeals and is successful, the nonappealing party
will get a victory that perhaps it does not want. If the intervenor
appeals and loses, the nonappealing party will be stuck with an
adverse decision from a higher court that will bind it in the future
2 11
through principles of stare decisis.
For those standingless intervenors who (1) seek to protect the
same interests, (2) seek to bring the same claims, or (3) seek to protect different interests, the constitutional requirements of standing do
not appear to apply. McConnell and Trbovich respectively cover the
first two scenarios by adopting a view of standing as a threshold issue
concerning those parties seeking to bring disputes before the court.
Since the interests of the intervenors and original parties often substantially overlap in these circumstances, adequate representation is
likely the most important factor for the court to determine before
allowing intervention. Additionally, since the standing inquiry is generally focused at those individuals bringing disputes before the court,
intervenors seeking to protect interests different than those presented
by a same-side party in a civil action should be allowed to intervene
without proving standing. With this third group of intervenors a court
may need to be wary of the introduction of new defenses that will
indirectly trigger new claims, which should require standing, as discussed below.
207 See supra Part IV.A.1.
208 See Appel, supranote 97, at 278 (citing Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 995 F.2d 571, 575
(5th Cir. 1993)).
209 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 233. As discussed in Part V.B.2, infra, this does not
mean that standing should not be required for some intervenors.
210 See Appel, supra note 97, at 287-88.
211 Id.
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Standing Required

Intervenors seeking to act as original plaintiffs by bringing new
claims into a suit should have to meet the requirements of standing as
well as prove that their new claims do not hinder the goal of Rule
24(a): to efficiently consolidate otherwise multiple suits. In allowing
new claims by standingless intervenors, some courts have "rel [ied] on
the proposition that successful applicants become parties" and therefore can assert new claims not contemplated by the original parties. 212
However, the Court in Trbovich made clear that a standingless intervenor's claims should be limited to those of the original plaintiffeven when such claims were intimately related to the underlying facts
of the case. 2 13 As discussed previously, the interests of intervention
and standing will often overlap, meaning that only a subsection of one
class of potential intervenors will likely be required to make this
higher showing of standing to intervene. By bringing a completely
new claim for the court to decide, this kind of intervenor is creating a
mini-trial within a trial, invoking the court's jurisdiction by asking it to
"decide the merits of [a new] dispute or of particular issues, '2 14 and
acting as a coequal party in the judicial process.2 15 In this posture, the
intervenor is in reality acting as a plaintiff initiating an original suit
and should therefore be forced to meet the threshold requirements of
standing-no matter on which side of the dispute the intervenor actually resides.
Even if the individual has standing to make the claim, the court
need not allow intervention where the claim is remote from the original subject matter of the suit. In this situation allowing the claim
212 See Tobias, supra note 15, at 445 & n.191 (citing Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822, 827 (2d Cir. 1963)).
213 Some argue that Trbovich "should be restricted to its facts and the peculiar
statutory scheme involved." Id. at 433. But every case of intervention is inherently
fact specific. See White, supra note 14, at 543 n.98 ("Perhaps the most problematic
aspect of the Supreme Court decisions addressing the Rule 24(a) interest requirement is their fact-bound nature. While precedent surely exists, the application of
these decisions is severely limited to narrow situations and provides minimal guidance
to the lower federal courts."). To assist the lower courts with this factual analysis, the
line must be drawn somewhere, and I suggest that after eliminating the majority of
cases that involve an overlap of the standing and intervention interests, and eliminating the remaining majority of cases that involve intervenors from the first three
groups discussed above, the courts are left with a small group of applicants that do
not have standing yet seek to bring independent claims before the court. The court
should either determine that these intervenors have standing to bring their claims or
should limit their claims to those of the original parties to the suit.
214 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
215 7C WRIGr ET AL., supra note 56, § 1921, at 619.
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would in reality create a whole new suit by the intervenor, thus ignoring Rule 24(a)'s goal of "prevent[ing] a multiplicity of suits where
common questions of law or fact are involved. '2 16 If the individual
does not have standing to make a claim, but has a sufficient interest in
the original dispute, the court should not deny intervention for lack
of standing, but should instead use its discretion to limit the inter21 7
venor's claims to those already presented by parties with standing.
Defendant intervenors seeking to take an offensive role by asserting counterclaims present an interesting case, as the authorities continue to disagree as to the "'proper treatment to be accorded
counterclaims asserted by an intervenor.' , 218 Agreeing with Professor
Wright, this Note recognizes a small exception to requiring standing
for new claims in that intervenors should not have to show an independent basis of jurisdiction for compulsory counterclaims. 2 19 Calling this an exception is in fact an overstatement, as it is "[i]n
accordance with the usual principles about compulsory counterclaims," for even original defendants are exempted from proving
standing for the purpose of asserting compulsory counterclaims. 22 0 In
contrast, a defendant seeking to assert a permissive counterclaim
upon entry into the suit must have an "independent basis of jurisdiction for the counterclaim. 21 2 ' Allowing permissive counterclaims
without standing would in fact grant the defendant intervenor greater
rights than the original parties-" [s] o long as it remains the rule that
an original defendant must have independent jurisdictional grounds
for a permissive counterclaim, this should be true also of
222
intervenors."
Requiring standing for an intervenor bringing a new claim is in
line with arguments of courts and commentators. The requirement of
standing is still being used in a threshold manner, examining the relationship between the intervenor and the new claim that she seeks to
bring-not examining the relationship of the intervenor to claims
already before the court. Furthermore, by presenting new cases and
216 Wash. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 922 F.2d 92, 97 (2d
Cir. 1990). In a situation such as this, the intervenor might struggle to show that her
interest is related to the subject of the action in a manner that disposing of the action
will impair or impede the interest. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 24(a) (2).

217 See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 537 (1972).
218 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 56, § 1921, at 614 (quoting Exch. Nat'l Bank v.
Abramson, 45 F.R.D. 97, 103 (D. Minn. 1968)).
219 Id. at 618.
220

Id.

221
222

Id. at 618-19.
Id. at 619.
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controversies for the court to decide, the intervenor is acting as a coequal party to the litigation-a posture assumed by those courts uniformly requiring standing. In this situation, there is no distinction
between initiation of and intervention in a suit as assumed by the
Court in Trbovich, because the intervenor is attempting both. By seeking to act as a full party, the intervenor should meet the requirements
be
of full parties and be required to show that she has standing to '223
"entitled to have the court decide the merits of the [new] dispute.
The argument that Rule 24(a) should be interpreted in the same
manner as Rule 19(a) (1) is weak in relation to the framework provided in this Note. First, despite similar "interest" language, the Rules
have been historically interpreted differently, 2 24 and it is unclear that
2 25
Rule 19 has in fact been read to exclude standing requirements.
Moreover, this Note does not take the extreme position that standing
should be required of all intervenors, as assumed by Karastelev's argument for identical treatment of the Rules. 226 Finally, Rules 24 and 19

are distinctly different rules, despite the similar language. Rule 24
involves an outsider seeking to "crash" an already-existing lawsuit without the permission of the existing parties. 227 Rule 19, on the other
hand, requires the existing parties to pull certain outsiders into their
case. 228 There is a large distinction between protecting a private lawsuit from being bombarded by unwanted outsiders and including an
outside party that is needed for the effective disposition of a case
already before the court; this distinction justifies different treatment
of the respective outside parties.
Federal courts are continually confronted with petitions for intervention in civil suits, and the courts have little precedent for granting
or denying intervention beyond the bright-line circuit rules that generally have remained constant despite the McConnell decision. McConnell made clear that not all applications must possess standing to
intervene in a dispute. Relying on Supreme Court precedent and various policy arguments, this Note takes the position that intervenors
from three groups-(1) those seeking to protect interests that are the
same as the same-side party with standing, (2) those seeking to bring
claims that are the same as the same-side party with standing, and (3)
those seeking to protect interests that are different from those of the
same-side party with standing-should be granted intervention with223
224
225
226
227
228

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
See Karastelev, supra note 38, at 469-70.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
See id. 19(a)(1).
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out having to show standing (assuming that they are able to meet the
other requirements of Rule 24(a)). The fourth group, intervenors
seeking to bring claims that are different from the same-side party
with standing, is the only group that presents an "end run" around
Article III of the Constitution. And this problem can be remedied by
limiting the intervenor's claims to those presented by original parties
with standing. Judges must also remember that even though they are
mandated to allow intervention under Rule 24(a), they have the discretion to shape and limit participation of the intervenors.
CONCLUSION

Early on, the Supreme Court recognized that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not create standing 22 9 but as the definition of
standing has ebbed and flowed, courts have recognized that the distinction between intervention and standing is not always apparent or
helpful. The large overlap between the two doctrines and the general
practice of ensuring only that the original plaintiff has standing simply
decreases the opportunities for the Supreme Court to provide lower
courts with a workable framework in the near future. Some courts,
over time, have fluctuated in their opinions on the relationship
between standing and intervention, but others have found a rather
bright-line position and adopted that method no matter the status of
the parties and potential intervenors or the relevant interests that they
present to the court.
This Note presents an alternate way of looking at the issue of
standing and intervention that falls between bright-line rules on the
one hand and case-by-case analysis on the other. By combining a form
of party status (bringing a claim or protecting an interest) with
whether the claim or interest is already presented by one of the Article
III parties, this Note attempts to aid courts in their classification of
parties and examine how these classifications interact with the goals of
standing and intervention. No matter what method a court decides to
use to determine how it must decide the merits of the case and craft
relief for the deserving parties, courts must remember the arsenal that
they have at their discretion for cases that are just too difficult to classify or parties that present unique and extreme positions. By injecting
discretion and equity into their classifications of intervenors, courts
can be true to the respective values of Article III and Rule 24 while
229 Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978) ("[I]t is axiomatic that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create or withdraw federal
jurisdiction.").
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also finding a balance between flexibility and uniformity in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

